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Introduction and Motivation
The forecasting of decision-making in the context of elections and public policy is the subject of an extensive literature. An increasingly significant part of this work considers the relevance and efficiency of betting or prediction markets in making these decisions (e.g. Page, 2011; Saville et al., 2011) . Betting on election outcomes has a long history, and is particularly well-documented in the case of presidential elections in the US (Rhode and Strumpf, 2013) . It has indeed been traced, according to contemporaries, back to the election of George Washington and has existed in organized markets since the administration of The forecasting of closed-door decisions has attracted a less extensive literature, confined for the most part to the prediction of Supreme Court rulings (e.g. Epstein et al, 2010; Johnson et al., 2009; Ruger et al., 2004) , and only a very small part of this literature considers the relevance or efficiency of betting or prediction markets in making these decisions (Blackman et al., 2012; Cherry and Rogers, 2006) . 1 This paper seeks to address this gap in the literature in the context of a closed door decision for which betting markets have existed for at least 500 years, the outcome of papal conclaves. The decision over the choice of Pope is of considerable significance for a number of reasons. The Pope is perhaps the last absolute monarch (Padovano and Wintrobe, 2013) and, as such, exercises a very significant degree of influence over the shape and direction of the Catholic Church. In turn this has a direct impact on the lives of millions of Catholics world-wide. Further, due to the widespread activities of the Church in the fields of health, education, economic development and diplomacy, the selection of a Pope has a global significance well beyond the immediate sphere of the Catholic Church. This is also an interesting type of election in that the electorate might be regarded as relatively 'non-complex', defined by Jottier et al. (2012) in terms of size and heterogeneity. Jottier et al. argue that in such cases, prediction accuracy should be high relative to where there are larger, more heterogeneous electorates.
The specific focus of this paper is to examine how efficiently (or otherwise) the papal betting markets were able to incorporate both public and private information revealed during the course of the conclave. In this task, we are fortunate in having access to a unique dataset which provides detailed information on the betting market for every potential papal contender. In the next section of the paper, we draw together several sources to summarise what is known about gambling in historical papal elections. We then explain the background and context for betting on the 2013 conclave. In section 4, we introduce our data and the empirical methodology we employ. Finally we report and discuss our empirical results.
Betting on Papal Elections: the historical context
The first recorded example of betting on a papal election can be traced to the papal conclave of September, 1503, at which time it was considered already "an old practice" (Baumgartner, 2003 p.250; Villard, 2009 The next conclave for which we have the betting odds is that of December, 1521, in which odds were offered on no fewer than twenty cardinals. Giulio de'Medici, the cousin of Leo X, was the betting favourite, at 100 to 25 (4 to 1), followed closely by Cardinal Alessandro Farnese at 100 to 20 (5 to 1), whose odds shortened to 100 to 40 (5 to 2) after a Roman mob plundered his house (Baumgartner, 2003 pp. 95-6) . Though Farnese at one point came close to being elected Pope, he could not reach the required two-thirds of the vote (Brewer, 1920 p. 798) , and ultimately the cardinals looked outside of the conclave, electing
Adrian of Utrecht as Pope Adrian VI.
During the papal conclave of 1549-1550, Dandolo describes how Cardinal Gianmaria del Monte (who was eventually elected Julius III) had opened in the betting as the 5 to 1 (against) favourite, but within three days Cardinal Reginald Pole had been established at odds of 4 to 1 (CSP, 1970 p.274-6) . On December 5, as balloting began, Pole was clear favourite at 100 to 95. On that day, he received 26 of the 28 votes that would have given him the twothirds majority required to elect him Pontiff. Although on the point of being made Pope by acclamation, Pole insisted on waiting until he won the formal two-thirds majority (Baumgartner, 1985 p. 306) . By the time that four additional French cardinals, opposed to Pole, arrived December 11, however, he was trading at 5 to 2, and a month later he was being offered at odds of 100 to 16 (Baumgartner, 2003 pp.108-9) . Dandolo had reported to his superiors early in the conclave: "It is more than clear that the merchants are very well informed about the state of the poll, and that the cardinals' attendants in Conclave go partners with them in wagers, which this causes many tens of thousands of scudi (crowns) to change hands" (CSP, 1970 p.281 ).
The first 1590 conclave, in September, is the earliest in which reports of insider trading emerged, when two of the key influencers of votes in the conclave, Cardinals
Montalto and Sforza secretly agreed to join forces in support of Niccolo Sfondrato. It is reported that both made fortunes betting on him, at odds of 10 to 1 the day before he was elected as Pope Urban VII. As the conclave opened, he was trading at 100 to 11, compared to Giambattista Castagna, who was offered at 100 to 22 (Baumgartner, 2003 . At lunchtime Tuesday, April 19, after three ballots, Ratzinger was favourite on two out of the three online betting boards monitored by CNN, 5 and by the last day of the conclave had shortened to a clear 3 to 1 favourite. Toman (2004) analyses the dynamics of conclave voting using data collected from seven conclaves, beginning with the election of Benedict XV in 1914 to John Paul II in 1978 Modelling the election procedure using a linear feedback count panel data model, she found three significant patterns. First, that the number of votes obtained during the previous ballot is strongly and positively correlated with the votes obtained during the ongoing ballot.
Secondly, she found a momentum effect, so that the growth in votes a cardinal obtains between the previous ballot (at time t-1) and the one before that (time t-2) is positively correlated with votes obtained during the current ballot (time t). In other words, candidates tend to give more votes to a cardinal whose votes are seen as growing, and vice-versa.
Finally, the effect of "nocturnal conversations" (discussions made after the end of the day)
tends to sizeably reduce the number of votes obtained by the cardinal leading in the vote. A possible explanation for this finding is that these conversations allow cardinals to coordinate and hinder the election of the leading cardinal.
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In summary, papal conclaves do have some history, dating back to 1503, of electing one of the favourites in the betting, but this is by no means a general rule, and there is some evidence of predictable patterns of voting. The historical evidence is that the betting markets have a patchy record in assimilating information about the identity of the next Pope, but there is clear historic evidence, not least from tracking movements in the betting odds during the course of the conclave, that the markets do show evidence of having picked up in a number of documented cases genuine information of predictive value about the outcome of papal elections.
The 2013 Conclave
We now turn to the 2013 conclave which eventually led to the election of Cardinal Jorge An analysis was also reported in the National Catholic Register 8 of the likely age of the incoming Pope based on three trends -age at vacancy, length of reign and age at election.
In terms of age at leaving office, the last several Popes (except for John Paul 1) were over 80 years old, a result of a rising trend over the last 500 years. A similar rising trend in the length of reign indicates that a reign of 15 years is now an indicative guideline. An upward, though less steep, upward trend in the age at election, indicates that someone in their late 60s (around 68) is a good guideline. In conclusion, this analysis pinpointed the expected age of the new pope to be about 68, to be expected to reign for about 15 years. More generally, the analysis concluded that "the next pope is likely to be between 60 and 70." Of the 115 cardinal electors, 47 were in this age range. Jorge Bergoglio (76) was not one of them.
Of perhaps more significance than age is country or region of origin. In particular, a In the next section we examine how the extent to which prices for the key contenders actually responded to the release of both private and public information.
Methodology and Data
We focus on prices during the final twenty four hours of the conclave betting market. For our purposes, price is defined as the probability of a contender winning the election as implied by the Betfair odds. As described above, during this time, we identify four key time points (A to D) at which significant additional information was potentially available to the market.
Events A and C provided public information to the extent that they revealed that no Pope had been elected. More importantly, however, at these points, insiders who were aware of the breakdown of votes in the inconclusive ballots would have been in possession of information unavailable to the general public regarding the likely prospects of the key contenders. In principle, this information could have been exploited to engage in insider trading on the betting markets.
Events B and D indicate points at which that same information was made publicly available. At 11:57 on 13 th March (a little under one hour after Event D, the publication of the second La Stampa article) the Guardian live blog reported on the article, naming the three remaining contenders and hence publicising this information more widely to an Englishspeaking audience. We consider the implications of the publication of the Guardian blog below.
The betting data we use comes from Betfair, the world's largest person-to-person betting exchange. 16 Betfair supplied us with a unique dataset comprising a complete record of every bet (recorded and time-stamped in-running) for every candidate in the papal election.
Each record includes the amount bet, the price achieved and the timestamp. For the majority of our analysis we aggregate the data up to the hourly level to ensure there is a reasonable level of liquidity. The mean size of a wager in the papal conclave was just over £10. In total, over the course of the market, over 17,000 bets were placed giving a total sum wagered of £180,312. Anyone based in Italy, however, at the point of trading, was not able to place a bet through Betfair on the conclave.
Our approach is to track graphically prices at the end of each hour on the betting markets of the main contenders over the final twenty four hours of the conclave market and to examine the effect on prices at each of these points. We identify two groups of contenders. Having examined the impact of our four events on the prices of each cardinal, we then go on to estimate a formal econometric model of market efficiency for each of the three main contenders (as revealed by the second La Stampa report and subsequently verified by other sources). We use a standard approach to testing for information inefficiencies by testing whether past movements in asset prices can be used to predict positive returns. On the assumption of an efficient market, current returns should follow a random walk process and lagged returns should have no explanatory power. When estimating such models, it is important to take account of the impact of time-varying volatility, or Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) (Engle, 1982) . Not doing so is likely to lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. There exist a whole class of models to deal with ARCH effects. Most common in the analysis of asset prices is the use of Generalised ARCH (GARCH) models (Bollerslev, 1986) . In these models, the time-dependent volatility is estimated as a function of observed prior volatility, measured as the lagged value(s) of the squared regression disturbances and, also, lagged value(s) of the conditional variance. The order of the GARCH model is given by the number of lags in each case. In the context of market efficiency for asset prices, the GARCH(p, q) model can be represented as follows: (1) (2) where Rt represents returns in hour t, t is assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero mean and variance  2 ; i are the ARCH parameters; i are the GARCH parameter(s). We define returns on hour t in the normal way as Rt = log(Pt/Pt-1) where Pt is the betting price for the contender at the end of hour t. We use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the optimal lag length of the ARCH and GARCH parameters.
We supplement equation 1 by the inclusion of dummy variables for each of the four time points identified above. We include one lag of event D (publication of the second La Stampa article) to allow for the further dissemination of the information via the Guardian.
Significant coefficients on dummy variables for events A and C will provide information on the extent to which private information held by insiders was incorporated into the market.
The coefficients for events B and D indicate how the market incorporated public information.
We would expect the effect of these dummy variables to vary with each contender. In particular, for Cardinal Bergoglio who was not originally considered by the markets to be a realistic contender, we would expect a significant and positive coefficient for the two public information dummies. A positive coefficient for the two private information dummies would indicate significant trading by insiders on the basis of such information.
We estimate this model using hourly data from the opening of the market as 21.00
GMT on the 28 th February until the close of the market at 18.00 GMT on the 13 th March.
This gives us a total of 310 observations.
Results
In Figures 1a and 1b we track hourly mean price for individual Cardinals in the critical final 24 hours period of betting. We present plots for two groups of Cardinals. The first is those identified ex post as having attracted significant numbers of votes in the early rounds. The second are those cardinals who were expected to poll well prior to voting but who were identified ex post as receiving few or no votes.
Taking each of our events in turn, event A (the first appearance of black smoke)
indicates a time at which insiders would have been aware that the first group of cardinals (reported in Figure 1 ) were all still in the running, whereas the chances of those in the second group (who had originally attracted a lot of betting but did not attract many or any votes) had clearly been overestimated. In fact, the time paths provide very little evidence that insiders exploited this information to any significant degree. In many cases, prices changed very little after that point or continued on a previously established trend. Indeed, in some cases the graphs suggest a perverse effect. We now go on to look at standard market efficiency regressions for some of the main candidates: Cardinals Bergoglio, Ouellet and Scherer. As explained above, we employ a simple GARCH specification using hourly data over the course of the whole market. We also include dummy variables for the hour of occurrence of each of the four events discussed above. The key results are reported in Table 1 .
Taking the market for Cardinal Bergoglio first, there is no overall evidence of market inefficiency in that mean returns (as revealed by the constant term) are not significantly different from zero and the lagged returns variable has no significant explanatory power. In contrast, for both Ouellet and Scola, the coefficient on lagged returns is negative and significant suggesting that lagged returns have significant explanatory power.
The results for the four timed events presents us with a mixed picture. The appearance of the first black smoke is associated with significantly negative returns for Bergoglio and Ouellet, the opposite to what we would expect had insiders used the private information that these candidates had attracted a significant number of votes in the early rounds. The second private information event (second black smoke) is more consistent with expectations: for both Bergoglio and Ouellet the coefficient on the dummy variable is positive and significant.
Looking at the revelation of public information regarding voting patterns, the publication of the first La Stampa article appears to have had little or no effect on returns for
Bergoglio. This is striking given that it was the first appearance of any information indicating that he was a front-runner. Intriguingly, the second episode of additional public information (the second La Stampa article) is associated with negative returns at first and only when the Guardian blog further disseminated this information, do returns become strongly positive and significant. Taken together, these results are suggestive of the markets processing information in an inconsistent manner and also of significant lags in the processing of public information.
Discussion and Conclusions
In summary, there is evidence of some reaction in the betting market to the breaking information relating to the outcome of the conclave, but in retrospect a clear under-reaction in terms of both extent and speed of incorporation. We note in particular what we might term the 'Galeazzi anomaly'.
In general, online person to person betting markets provide excellent potential for insiders to exploit any inefficiencies in the way the market adjusts to new information. The costs of entry into the Betfair market are low, simply a small up-front deposit into the trading account, and the market was reasonably liquid for clients of the exchange. However, it was not possible to trade from Italy with Betfair on the Conclave. This institutional feature may explain, at least partly, why the market was slow to adjust to newly revealed information.
That said, given that the relevant information was widely available and publicised in the UK where Betfair is much better known and very accessible, this is unlikely to be anywhere close to a complete solution.
What can we conclude from these findings? Either that the public release of accurate information from a generally well respected news source was not (for good or bad reason on this occasion) sufficiently believed by those able to place a trade on the exchange, or else it was significantly overlooked by traders. In other words, the betting market did not perform as well as might have been expected in terms of responding to new public information, which given its provenance and authoritative tone might have been expected to be accurate, and which turned out to be so. This cannot be explained in terms of the fog of conflicting signals as there were no other credible sources issuing conflicting information.
More generally, the main lesson we can perhaps take from this analysis is that decisions taken by individuals or groups of individuals whose choices are shrouded, at least from outsiders, in a layer of secrecy, may not always be as impenetrable as conventional wisdom about the secrecy of the deliberations might suggest. Rather, it is a question of knowing where to look for the information, and identifying which information to believe.
We venture that in the context of the most recent papal election, sufficient credible information was in the public domain to allow profitable exploitation of this information, yet markets failed to reflect this. To this extent, it reinforces the conclusion of Vaughan Williams (2014) (iv) *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** at the 5% level;* at the 10% level. (v) AIC is the Akaike Information Criterion for model selection and is calculated as AIC = -2(L -k) where k is the number of parameters being estimated. The AIC suggests a maximum lag order of one for the ARCH and GARCH terms.
